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ABSTRACT: A widespread view in philosophy claims that inner speech is closely tied to 
human metacognitive capacities. This so-called format view of inner speech considers that 
talking to oneself allows humans to gain access to their own mental states by forming 
metarepresentation states through the rehearsal of inner utterances (section 2). The aim of 
this paper is to present two problems to this view (section 3) and offer an alternative view 
to the connection between inner speech and metacognition (section 4). According to this 
alternative, inner speech (meta)cognitive functions derivate from the set of commitments 
we mobilize in our communicative exchanges. After presenting this commitment-based 
approach, I address two possible objections (section 5).  
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1. Introduction: Talking to Oneself  
Metacognition or thinking about thinking is a fundamental human cognitive 
capacity.1 This capacity is devoted to evaluating, predicting or modifying our 
cognitive performances, so it endows us with a unique cognitive and behavioral 
flexibility and adaptability. Several authors have claimed that there is a 
constitutive connection between these metacognitive capacities and the linguistic 
ability of talking to oneself,2 so humans are able to flexibly modify, regulate and 
access their cognitive processes because they are able to structure their own mental 
states in a linguistic format through self-directed talk. This so-called format view 
of inner speech3 claims that capturing our mental states in linguistic format allows 
                                                        
1 Michael T. Cox, Anita Raja, and Eric Horvitz, eds., Metareasoning. Thinking about Thinking 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2011); John Dunlosky and Janet Metcalfe, eds. Metacognition (Los 
Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2019).  
2 Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (London: The Penguin Press, 1991); Ray 
Jackendoff, The architecture of the language faculty (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997); Andy 
Clark, Being there (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997); Jose Luis Bermudez, Thinking without 
words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
3 Fernando Martínez-Manrique and Agustín Vicente, “The activity view of inner speech,” 
Frontiers in psychology 6 (2015): 232. 
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us to acquire the metarepresentational capacities underlying the unique human 
metacognitive competence of modifying and accessing our own mental states  
The aim of this paper is to defend an alternative to the format view as a 
theory of the connection between inner speech and metacognition. The alternative 
I put forward is based on a Commitment-Based approach to communication and 
inner speech according to which the main purpose of communication is to 
establish commitments and entitlements to coordinate agents; so, the cognitive 
function of inner speech derivate from this social function of outer speech. The 
structure of the papers goes as follows: Firstly, I present the format view along 
with two objections (section 2 and 3). These objections challenge two central ideas 
of the format view: (1) the notion of metacognition as access, and (2) the idea that 
metacognition requires metarepresentations. In section 4 and 5, I introduce the 
commitment-based view and how it can account for the different cognitive 
functions associated with metacognition. Finally, in section 6, I address two 
possible objections to the alternative.  
2. The Format View of Inner Speech  
Inner speech is often defined as the phenomenon we experience when talking 
silently to ourselves. The contemporary interest on the phenomenon starts with 
the publication in English of the work of the Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky 
who, after realizing that children systematically talk to themselves out loud 
(private speech), started to study the role of private and inner speech in the 
development of high cognitive capacities.4 In contemporary psychology, the 
research on private and inner speech has resulted into different studies that 
connect inner speech with different cognitive capacities, including conscious 
control, working memory and attention.5 
Besides this empirical evidence, there are different debates on the format, 
nature, and function of inner speech.6 The fundamental question underlying those 
                                                        
4 Lev S. Vygotsky, Thought and language (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984, Original work 
published 1934). 
5 Rafale Diaz and Laura Berk, eds. Private speech: From social interaction to self-regulation 
(Hillsdale, N.J.: L. Erlbaum, 1992); Daniel Gregory “Inner speech, imagined speech, and auditory 
verbal hallucinations,”Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7,3 (2016): 653–673; Adam 
Winsler, Charles Fernyhough and Ignacio Montero, eds. Private speech, executive functioning, 
and the development of verbal self-regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
6 Martínez-Manrique and Vicente, “What the...! The role of inner speech in conscious 
thought,”Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (2010): 141–167; Keith Frankish,“Evolving the 
linguistic mind,”Linguistic and Philosophical Investigation 9 (2010): 206–214;Peter Langland-
Hassan, “Inner speech and metacognition: in search of a connection,”Mind & Language29 (2014): 
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debates is why do we talk to ourselves? A widespread answer in philosophy of 
mind maintains that we talk to ourselves in order to display metacognitive abilities, 
that is, we talk to ourselves to consciously access our own thoughts.7 This so-called 
format view of inner speech associates the function of our self-talk to some 
structural features of the linguistic format. The main thesis is that language, in 
virtue of these features, is the only representational vehicle that allows codifying 
mental states in a way that can be objects of further thoughts. In other words, 
language facilitates what Clark calls second-order dynamics. Language codifies 
thoughts that can be brought into working memory in a way that attention can be 
directed to them, and thus, be objects of conscious access. Although these authors 
share the perspective of inner speech as a metacognitive facilitator, they differ 
about which properties make language appropriate for such function. In this sense, 
for instance, Clark argues that the features of language that allows us to recruit it 
for cognitive purposes are its context-dependency and neutral modality.8 On the 
other hand, Bermudez considers that, given that all conscious access must be 
carried out on perceptual modality, language is the only representational vehicle 
that allows personal level conscious access and is, at the same time, a structured 
vehicle. Contrary to other personal vehicles as images, language is structured and 
compositional. Contrary to other structured vehicles as mentalese inner speech is a 
vehicle we can consciously access.9 Thus, inner speech is the only representational 
format that facilitates second-order dynamics to conceptually structured thoughts.  
This picture on inner speech face several problems related with some of its 
fundamental theses.10 However, the aim of this paper is to reveal the problems of 
the view regarding two fundamental assumptions; namely, how the model assigns a 
central role to metarepresentations in metacognitive capacities, and how 
metacognition is understood in terms of access to mental states or processes. First, 
according to the format view, when an agent experiences an episode of inner 
                                                                                                                      
511– 533; Peter Langland-Hassan and Agustin Vicente, eds. Inner Speech: New Voices (USA: 
Oxford University Press,2018). 
7 Jose Luis Bermudez, Thinking without words; Andy Clark, Being there; Daniel C. Dennett, 
Consciousness Explained; Jackendoff, The architecture of the language faculty. 
8 Clark, Being there, 178. 
9 Jerry Fodor, The language of thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard university press, 1975) 
10 Apart from Martínez-Manrique and Vicente, “The activity view of inner speech,” the problems 
of the format view has been emphasized by Marta Jorba and Agustin Vicente, “Cognitive 
phenomenology, access to contents, and inner speech,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 21, 9-10 
(2014): 74-99; Víctor Fernández Castro, “Inner Speech in Action,” Pragmatics & Cognition 23, 2 
(2016): 238-258; or Bart Geurts, “Making sense of self talk,” Review of Philosophy and 
Psychology 9, 2 (2018): 271-285. 
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speech, for instance when someone utters silently a sentence such as ‘the 
unemployment in Europe have decreased at the expense of worker’s rights,’ she 
can access her own mental state because, through the access of this internal 
episode, she can infer the state that she believes that the unemployment in Europe 
have decreased at the expense of worker’s rights. So, metacognition requires 
forming representations about that mental state in order to perform other actions 
as controlling or regulating the state in question. This metacognitive capacity can 
be understood as a device that takes the content of an inner speech episode as an 
input and produce a metarepresentational state of the form ‘I believe (desire, 
imagine) that P’ as an output. Likewise, inner speech episodes allow us to access to 
our mental states as far as facilitates the generation of metarepresentations with the 
form ’S verbs P.’ Understanding metacognition in metarepresentational terms is 
not new. As Proust has shown, considering that metacognitive capacities rely upon 
the ability to form metarepresentation is widely shared assumption in cognitive 
sciences and philosophy.11 The innovation of the format view, then, is connecting 
these metarepresentational capacities to inner speech and the capacity of putting 
thoughts in a linguistic format.  
Second, the format view is strongly committed to a particular notion of 
metacognition as access.12 Again, as Proust argues, most of the philosophical 
approaches to metacognition in philosophy and cognitive sciences assume that the 
second-order regulation and control of cognitive processes require the subject to be 
able to access, either through introspection or inference, to the contents of the first 
level processes and states. So, humans could not regulate, evaluate and modify their 
first-order mental processes and states without having access to such processes and 
states. In the format view, capturing our thoughts through inner episodes allow us 
                                                        
11 Joëlle Proust has examined this and other aspects the standard view of metacognition (see 
Joëlle Proust, “Metacognition,” Philosophy Compass 5, 11 (2010): 989-998; The philosophy of 
metacognition: Mental agency and self-awareness (Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
She mentions as proponents of such standard view to John Flavell, “Metacognition and Cognitive 
Monitoring: A New Area of Cognitive- Developmental Inquiry,” American Psychologist 34 
(1979): 906–911; Alan Leslie, “Pretense and Representation: The Origins of Theory of Mind,’’ 
Psychological Review 94 (1987): 412–26; Josef Perner, Understanding the Representational Mind 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991); Alison Gopnik, “How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion 
of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, 1 (1993): 1–15; 
Peter Carruthers, “Meta-cognition in Animals: A Skeptical Look,” Mind and Language 23 (2008): 
58–89; “How Do We Know Our Own Minds: The Relationship between Mindreading and 
Metacognition.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2009): 121–82 
12 Joëlle Proust,“Metacognition and metarepresentation: is a self-directed theory of mind a 
precondition for metacognition?,” Synthese 159, 2 (2007): 271-295. 
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to access our mental states and processes because we can self-ascribe such states by 
forming metarepresentation of the form ‘I verb P.’ So, inner speech episodes 
facilitate the second-order access our metacognitive capacities consist in.  
3. Telepaths and the Young Rich Communist  
This section brings into focus two objections of the format view, which lay on the 
two aforementioned assumptions. That is, the idea that metacognition must be 
understood in terms of access and the idea that metacognition is carried out in a 
metarepresentational format. These two objections prepare the ground for 
defending the commitment-based approach I characterize in the next section.  
The first problem to the format view lies on the restricted power of the 
notion of metacognition as access to account for how inner speech make a 
difference for explaining the cognitive and behavioral flexibility associated to 
metacognition. In principle, the explanandum of a theory of this type must be to 
explain how inner speech, as long as it endows linguistic creatures with certain 
metacognitive capacities, can account for some of the patterns of actions and 
mental skills associated with thinking about thinking, for instance, cognitive 
flexibility or the capacity to evaluate and regulate actions. However, the format 
view seems to fail to achieve this objective. Although the format view gives a 
reasonable explanation of how a creature can access to her mental states, it is hard-
pressed to explain how this access is translated into certain special cognitive 
abilities. For instance, why the metacognitive capacities associated with inner 
speech facilitate the rise of cognitive regulation or flexibility. Part of the obstacle a 
defender of the format view must address is that, although the position claims that 
inner speech brings certain mental states into consciousness, it does not explain 
how this ‘bringing mental states into consciousness’ plays a role in regulating or 
evaluating first- order processes. As McGeer argues, having access to our own 
mental states would play a role analogous to the role of a telepath that could read 
our mind, seeing our mental states and processes, but could not exercise any type 
of power to modify or regulate them.13 If the format theory aims to explain which 
function the inner speech plays in the acquisition of metacognitive capacities, the 
theory should not only explain how certain distinctive mental states or processes 
are produced, but also how accessing those states and processes make a difference 
for the type of abilities we usually associate with metacognition (control of 
attention, regulation, cognitive flexibility).14 In other words, monitoring our 
                                                        
13 Victoria McGeer, “The Moral Development of First‐Person Authority,” European Journal of 
Philosophy 16, 1 (2007): 81-108.  
14 See Proust, The philosophy of metacognition, 29-78. 
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mental states is not sufficient for explaining the cognitive and behavioral flexibility 
associated with metacognition, and thus, the format view must be regarded as 
incomplete.  
A possible way out to this problem may appeal to the notion of 
metarepresentation. The defender of the format view could argue that the 
metarepresentational states that inner speech produces could modify certain 
pattern of behavior and cognition in a flexible way. For instance, image a physicist 
on the way home to finish an article that the editors of a journal have been waiting 
for. At the moment, she is entering her house, an utterance crosses her mind ‘the 
dinner!’ Suddenly, she remembers she has invited some friends for dinner and the 
fridge is empty. ‘I gotta go to the grocery store.’ The physicist changes her route 
and stops at the grocery store before going home. According to the format view, 
inner speech episodes could allow the agent to access her mental states 
(remembering that she has organized a dinner, the belief that the fridge is empty 
and the belief that she must go to the grocery store) in a way that she can abort her 
action of going home and trigger the action of walking toward the store.  
However, this solution does not solve the problem. Notice that explaining 
how behavioral and cognitive flexibility derivate from inner speech does not seem 
to necessarily rely on metarepresentational states. In principle, the physicist’s 
cognitive processes can be carried out by first-order processes. The appropriate 
behavioral pattern can be triggered by bringing out the appropriate information 
without a self-ascription of the given mental states; for instance, bringing out the 
information that she should go to the store and that she has a dinner tonight rather 
than the self-attribution of such mental states. It is the mental states per se and not 
the self-attribution of these states what seems to play a role in the realization of the 
action. As Jorba and Vicenteargue, if the function of inner speech is to put on a 
propositional content in a format that allows our ‘inner eye’ to access the content, 
then the format theory explains how we can produce a metarepresentational state, 
e.g. ‘I believe that P,’ from an utterance with the content P.15 However, if the 
outcome of the cognitive processes involving inner speech episodes are second-
order states, it is difficult to see how they can affect the first order states that, after 
all, are the producers of the behavior at stake. As Marti ́nez-Manrique and Vicente 
say:  
[T]he model they propose seems to only be able to explain how IS gives us 
knowledge of what and how we think. Let’s say that by using sentences of our 
language, we are able to have some kind of object before our minds. What do we 
                                                        
15 Jorba and Vicente, “Cognitive phenomenology, access to contents, and inner speech;” see also, 
Martínez-Manrique and Vicente, “The Activity View of Inner Speech.” 
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gain with that? Presumably, we only gain knowledge about what we are thinking. 
We “see” the sentence, get its meaning, and reach the conclusion “ok, I’m 
thinking that p.” This knowledge about what and how we are thinking may be 
very useful, of course, but we would say that this is only a use of IS, among many 
others. The account, in any case, does not explain how thought-contents are made 
access-conscious.16 
That is to say, gaining access to our mental states by producing a self-
ascribed metarepresentational state does not account for how our actions or the 
first-order mechanism are monitored, evaluated or regulated. Furthermore, the 
format view does not seem to respect the way we experience the inner speech 
episodes. When our physicist talks to herself ‘the dinner!’ or ‘I should go to the 
grocery store,’ she is encouraging herself to perform the action in the same way she 
would do it when directing these sentences to someone else. In this sense, the type 
of experience associated with the inner speech act is analogous to the external 
speech act but it does not seem to bear any resemblance with our ascriptions of 
mental states as the emphasis on the metarepresentational aspects suggests. In this 
sense, the format view does not respect our intuitions regarding how we 
experience inner speech episodes.  
Certainly, the defenders of the format view could exploit other 
argumentative strategy. For instance, defending that the inner speech episodes that 
lead to self-ascriptions of the type ‘I believe that P’ or ‘I desire that P’ play a 
decisive role for a special kind of metacognition: future directed self-control. 
Future directed self-control requires evaluating our mental states and explore the 
type of genuine actions and processes that derivate from these ascriptions. In this 
sense, the defender of the format view could attribute to inner speech some kind of 
cognitive control over the behavioral consequences of their past, present and 
future mental states. Vierkant has illustrated this move through an example of 
Parfit where a young communist wins the lottery.17 The young communist knows 
that rich people uses to be conservative, so he considers that if he does not get rid 
of the money (donating), he will become someone who does not want to be in the 
future, a conservative. So, the young communist is in the difficult position of 
donating the money and stick her ideals, or enjoying a comfortable life but 
becoming someone that he now would detest. The kind of mental skills the young 
communist engages in his considerations require self-ascribing mental states to 
                                                        
16 Martínez-Manrique and Vicente, “The Activity View of Inner Speech,” 4-5. 
17 See Tillman Vierkant, “What metarepresentation is for,” in The foundations of metacognition, 
eds. Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner, and Joëlle Proust (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012). The example appears in Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984). 
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himself and his future self, that is, metarepresentations. In this view, the defenders 
of the format view can embrace the idea that inner speech, as a producer of 
metarepresentations, will allow the young communist to attribute mental states to 
himself and his future self in order to evaluate which pattern of action to follow in 
the present given his attributions. This and analogous cases, where metacognitive 
capacities involve self-ascriptions, seem to be a plausible way for resisting the 
onslaughts against the format view.  
This brings me to the second objection. Notice that the rationale for the 
format view is that inner speech facilitates the detection of underlying mental 
states that, after being metarepresented, we can manipulate. This idea assumes that 
our inner speech episodes voice or express the causally efficacious mental states 
that compose our first-order processes. However, this idea conflicts with empirical 
evidence regarding the phenomena of confabulation.18 These studies show that 
humans are not always aware of the real causes of their actions, and in fact, they 
systematically provide ad hoc reasons to rationalize them. For instance, in the 
classic experiments carried out by Nisbett and Wilson, several subjects were asked 
which pair of panties they prefer and why. The panties were distributed on a table 
in a way that the subjects chose them by the distribution but they appeal to aspects 
such as the elasticity and the quality even though the panties were the same. These 
and other studies speak in favor of the idea that our reasons often are an instance of 
confabulation. Following this reasoning, it expectable to assume that our inner 
speech episodes do not necessarily voice our real mental states, and thus, it would 
be problematic to assume that the mental states the young communist attribute to 
his present self really reflect his mental states. Likewise, it is not clear how the 
mental states he ascribes to himself were real descriptions of his current mental 
states, and thus, played a causal role to modify his behavior for non-ending up 
being a conservative old person.19 
Furthermore, even accepting the format view as an accurate explanation of 
this kind of metacognitive control, the explanatory power of the theory is too 
                                                        
18 Richard Nisbett and Timothy D. Wilson, “Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on 
mental processes,” Psychological review 84, 3 (1977): 231; Michael Gazzaniga, The mind's past 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Timothy D. Wilson, Strangers to ourselves 
(Cambridge: Belknap. 2002); Thalia Wheatley, “Everyday confabulation,” In Confabulation: 
views from neuroscience, psychiatry, psychology, and philosophy, ed. William Hirstein (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009).  
19 Admittedly, not all versions of metacognition as access necessarily have troubles for explaining 
confabulation. An instance of this is Peter Carruthers, The opacity of mind: an integrative theory 
of self-knowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). However, they still would have to 
answer the telepath argument. Thanks to Tobias Störzinger for bringing my attention to this.  
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restricted. Although the cognitive function the young communist exercises could 
be accurately captured by the format view, the explanatory power of the theory is 
restricted to the cases involving metarepresentations, leaving aside cases where we 
directly control our first-order processes and behavior without such 
metarepresentations. As a conclusion, the format view cannot give a satisfactory 
explanation of how inner speech, as facilitator of second-order access, provides the 
acquisition of metacognitive capacities that regulate, modify or evaluate our 
cognition and behavior.  
4. A Commitment-Based Approach to Inner Speech  
In the previous section, I offered several arguments against the format view of 
inner speech. The aim of this section is to provide an alternative to the format 
view. This alternative, known as commitment-based approach, has been recently 
proposed by Geurts as an appropriate understanding of the cognitive functions of 
inner speech.20 For the purpose of this article, I concentrate on how this approach 
can convincingly account for the role of inner speech in metacognition.  
The commitment-based approach starts from the idea that the functions of 
inner speech derivate from the functions that speech acts play in coordinating 
agents in social interactions.21 One way to capture how speech acts facilitate 
coordination between agents is by attending to how they modify the normative 
statuses of the speakers and her audience in terms of the commitments, duties and 
enabling conditions the speaker and audience undertake.22 For instance, Geurts 
presents the idea as follows: “Commitment is a sine qua non for action 
coordination: social agents must rely on each other to act in some ways and refrain 
from acting in others. Commitments are coordination devices, and the main 
purpose of communication is to establish commitments.”23 Similarly, Kukla and 
Lance understand speech acts in terms of pragmatic input and outputs, where the 
                                                        
20 Geurts, “Making sense of self talk.” 
21 The idea that the function of inner speech derivates from the social function of outer speech is 
often traced back to Lev S. Vygotsky, Thought and language. For contemporary versions of these 
idea see Martínez-Manrique and Vicente, “The activity view of inner speech;” Jorba and Vicente, 
“Cognitive phenomenology, access to contents, and inner speech,”Fernández Castro, “Inner 
Speech in Action;” or Geurts, “Making sense of self talk.” 
22 Robert Brandom, Making it explicit: Reasoning, representing, and discursive commitment 
(Cambridge: Harvard university press, 1998); Rebecca Kukla and Mark Norris Lance, 
'Yo!'and'Lo!': The Pragmatic Topography of the Space of Reasons (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2009), Bart Geurts, “Communication as commitment sharing: speech acts, 
implicatures, common ground,” Theoretical linguistics(2019). 
23 Geurts, “Making sense of self talk,” 8. 
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inputs are a set of enabling conditions and the outputs are a set of commitments, 
duties and entitlement the speaker and the audience undertake when recognizing 
the force and content of the speech act. In these views, the commitments we 
undertook when performing a speech act can be seen in terms of new possibilities 
for action. For instance, If I promise to someone that I will go with her to the 
theater, I am expressing a set of commitments with particular patterns of actions, 
including being at the theater at the time we stipulate. Certainly, not all speech 
acts present these direct goal-oriented commitments but even when one performs 
an assertion, the speaker is exhibiting certain commitment with what is rationally 
and socially expected from this assertion. For example, if I assert that the ice of the 
lake is dangerously thin, I am committing myself with future patterns of actions 
my audience is entitled to expect: that I will not skate on the ice or that I will warn 
other people of the danger. In other words, asserting something is expressing 
certain commitments with actions that our audience may expect us to follow.  
Notice that carrying out a speech act does not necessarily involve we are in a 
particular mental state. As Geurts puts it:  
Commitments are obligations, and although they may be underwritten by suitable 
mental states, it is not necessary that they are. Insincere commitments are as 
binding as sincere ones, and there are unintended commitments, too. If I raise my 
hand at an auction, I thereby commit myself to be making a bid for whatever is 
currently under the hammer, even if I have no intention of doing so. True, I can 
try to get out of my commitment, for example, by arguing that I was only waving 
away a fly, but that presupposes there is a commitment to be undone.24 
The patterns of actions associated with the commitments that follow from a 
particular speech act do not necessarily rely on the assumption that we are in 
particular mental state causally connected to these actions. Instead, the theory 
assumes that certain normative structures (rational and social) police our 
interactions in a way that connect the content of our commitments with such 
patterns of actions. For instance, we know what to expect from someone asserting 
that the ice is dangerously thin because we know what an agent ought to do in 
such circumstances given the rational and social structures that regulate our 
actions.  
The commitment-based approach can help us to explain the social functions 
of our speech acts. The main advantage of this view is that it can account of the 
role of our speech acts in social coordination without reducing them to a mere 
exchange of information. Given that, the view is better posed to explain the speech 
acts whose function cannot be explained in terms of the information they provide 
                                                        
24 Geurts, “Making sense of self talk,” 9. 
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to the audience, that is, speech acts such as commands or promises, whose function 
does not seem to rely on how the audience gain certain piece of knowledge. 
Furthermore, the approach gives an automatic explanation of how our speech acts 
are connected to our social actions, so how they facilitate the coordination 
between speaker and audience.  
This theoretical apparatus allows us to account the cognitive functions of 
inner speech in terms of the social functions of outer speech. That is, the inner 
speech episodes play a functional role in our cognitive machinery that is analogous 
to the role that external speech acts play in our social interactions. When someone 
asserts internally that ice of the lake is too thin, one is giving rise to private 
commitments with what is followed from the ice of the lake being too thin. So, she 
can regulate her actions and align her mental states in accordance with the 
commitments associated with the content of the assertion. Similarly, when an 
agent privately commands something to herself go to the store, she gives rise to 
certain goal-directed commitment to perform the action of going toward the store.  
At this point, one may object that there is an important disanaology between 
outer and inner speech. Notice that, according to the commitment-based approach, 
the main function of communication is to coordinate agents. However, it is not 
entirely clear what exactly is the analog to coordination in the case of self-talk. In 
other words, if the function of inner speech derivate from the coordinating role of 
outer speech, then there must be a clear analog for coordination in the inner case. 
In order to address this challenge, one may argue that the function of outer speech 
for coordinating agents lies on the entitlements and commitments our speech 
instantiates. Once we learn how outer speech are associated to different patterns of 
action and cognition via those commitments and entitlement, we can rehearse 
such episodes in order to trigger the appropriate patterns.25 
 
 
                                                        
25 Further, one may argue that, as for the case of intentions, inner speech episodes, as prompters 
of commitments, can promote intra-personal coordination by aligning volitional attitudes and 
practical reasoning. For instance, if I say to myself ‘I will take the bus earlier tomorrow’, this 
episode can instantiate a commitment that will help me to align my desire-like attitude toward 
intending to take the bus with the practical reasoning capacities necessary to find the more 
rational way to perform the action. For such a view regarding intentions see Michael Bratman, 
Intention, plans, and practical reason (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987) and 
Elisabeth Pacherie, “Conscious Intentions: The Social Creation Myth,” Open MIND 29 (2015). 
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5. The Metacognitive Functions of Inner Speech  
This section aims to account for the metacognitive functions associated with inner 
speech without postulating second-order access mechanisms o 
metarepresentational capacities. To see the contrast, notice that the format view 
appeals to the representational information included in the inner speech episode 
that produces a metarepresentation of the agent being in certain mental state in 
order to explain cognitive and behavioral flexibility. As I argued before, the two 
fundamental problems of this view are that self-ascriptions do not necessarily 
involve the capacity of modifying our first-order mental processes and actions. So, 
we can conceive circumstances where an agent ascribes to himself a particular 
mental state but this ascription does not make any difference. Furthermore, we can 
conceive several circumstances where agents regulate their actions and mental 
processes without having access to these states. In other words, intervening our 
own cognition and action do not require metarepresenting or accessing our mental 
states. 
In order to see how the commitment-based approach can explain the 
connection between inner speech and metacognition, consider again the example 
of the physicist explained in section 3. The physicist privately utters the expression 
‘the dinner’ which make her remember she has a dinner that night. Furthermore, 
she says to herself ‘I should go to the grocery store’ after considering she did not 
have food at home. The rationale behind the idea that the action of the physicist 
exhibits a kind of metacognitive endeavor rely on the fact that she refrains to 
perform the action she was doing (going back home) and triggers a new action on 
the light of new considerations. In this sense, she evaluates the situation and 
regulates her cognitive mechanisms to change her mind and carry out the action of 
going to the store instead of going home. The problem of the format view is that 
the outcome of the physicist’s chain of reasoning is a self-ascription that in 
principle does not necessarily involve to regulate her action. Furthermore, it is 
hard to see how we can understand her regulatory capacities in terms of access to a 
mental state, especially when her private episode ‘I should go to the store’ does not 
seem to be a previous mental state in the physicist cognitive machinery, rather 
than a conclusion she has arrived from an episode of reasoning considering the 
situation. Given that, the format view should accept that the mental state 
represented by the private speech ‘I should go to the store’ was previously 
instantiated in the physicist’s mind or abandon the idea that this case represents a 
case of metacognition in terms of access.  
In the commitment-based approach, we can account for the case of the 
physicist in terms of evaluation and regulation. The metacognitive capacities 
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displayed has to do with evaluating an action or mental processes in accordance 
with certain commitments and regulating first-order mental processes and patterns 
of action to align them with these commitments. When the physicist brings into 
consciousness her memory episode through the expression ‘the dinner’ she 
evaluates her current actions in terms of the commitments the utterance expresses. 
Thus, she refrains to go back home when considering her utterance gives rise to 
certain commitments her current action is not instantiating. In other words, her 
current action was not conforming the expected patterns given the restrictions  
imposed by the commitments of having a dinner that night. On the other 
hand, when she concludes that she should go to the store, she is privately 
committing herself with the appropriate pattern of action, and thus, she can 
regulate her actions in accordance with such commitments. In this sense, the inner 
utterance expresses the same set of commitment with actions that the sentence will 
express when used in a conversation with the purpose of coordinating with 
another person.  
This position differs from the format view in two fundamental aspects. 
Firstly, metacognition is associated with the notions of evaluation and 
conformation, rather than to the notion of access. When we assert P privately, we 
express a set of commitments that draw a cognitive trajectory we tend to conform 
in order to perform what these commitments prescribe us to do, that is, self-
imposed constraints to our actions. In this sense, the commitment-based approach 
allows us to account for the metacognitive function of inner speech in terms of 
evaluation and conformation rather than in terms of access. Following Proust’s 
idea, the type of cognitive and behavioral flexibility associated with metacognition 
does not require the agent to access her own mental states. In my view, rather 
revealing our previous mental states, our metacognitive capacities shape our 
cognition and action by triggering different prospective patterns we are inclined to 
follow given the commitments that the private episodes of inner speech generate.26 
Secondly, respecting our intuitions, the metacognitive function of inner 
speech is not related to the notion of metarepresentation. Modifying our cognitive 
capacities in a flexible way does not require being able to self-ascribe mental states. 
In several occasions, the regulation or evaluation of our cognition and action do 
not require engaging in metarepresentational thinking. In fact, we often engage in 
reasoning chains that lead us to a private judgment that we do not hold before, and 
thus, do not represent previous mental states. When we arrive at these judgments 
we can modify or regulate our actions in the light of the commitments these 
judgments without the necessity of self-ascribe any particular mental state. In 
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Víctor Fernández Castro 
258 
other words, the effective power of the inner sentence to instantiate the 
appropriate pattern of action does not require the person to be in the state 
associated with the sentence, and far less, to represent such mental states.  
6. Objections  
In the previous sections, I have offered a theoretical model of inner speech that 
account for some metacognitive functions without appealing to 
metarepresentations or taking for granted that metacognitive capacities require 
accessing mental states. This move enables us to get around the concern of the 
format view of inner speech. However, one may wonder whether or not 
embracing the commitment-based approach could give rise to another type of 
problems. In principle, there are two main objections one may envisage for the 
commitment-based approach. Firstly, one may argue that future directed self-
control (see section 3) fall out of the explanatory reach of the commitment-based 
approach. Secondly, one may consider that the notion of speech acts in terms of 
commitments is problematic or, at least, unnecessary for explaining the function of 
inner speech. This section is devoted to addressing these two objections.  
For addressing the first problem, consider again the case of the young rich 
communist. As we have seen, Vierkant argues this case exemplify a kind of 
metacognitive capacity that cannot be performed without the metarepresentations 
and access required by the format view. Given that, one may wonder whether this 
kind of metacognitive control is a feasible counterexample against the 
commitment- based approach. After all, the young rich communist case exhibits 
the features of metacognitive control the commitment-based approach casts into 
question as necessary for the display of the metacognitive function of inner speech. 
Now, it must be clarified that the commitment-based approach is compatible with 
the fact that we can display mental concepts (belief, desire, fear) in our reasoning 
or inner speech episodes. In fact, we often self-attribute mental states (avowals) 
putting those mental concepts into work. However, this does not mean such self-
ascriptions endow us with a particular mental access to our own psychological 
states.  
In fact, when we pay closer attention to the social role of self-ascriptions, we 
realize that in conversational contexts we often use the first-personal ascription 
with pragmatic purposes.27 For instance, the phrase ‘I think’ is frequently presented 
                                                        
27 James O. Urmson, “Parenthetical verbs,”Mind 6, 244 (1952): 480–496; Karin Aijmer, “I think: 
an English modal particle,” in Modality in Germanic Language: Historical and Comparative 
Perspectives, eds. Toril Swan and Olaf Westik (De Gruyter Mouton, 1997); Anna 
Wierzbicka, English: Meaning and culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Mandy 
Inner Speech and Metacognition: A Defense of the Commitment-Based Approach 
259 
as having the function to mitigate the degree of commitment to the sentence it 
ranges. Wierzbicka provides a deep analysis of parenthetical uses of ‘believe,’ 
‘think’ and other mental verbs. She claims that the verb ‘think’ conveys the 
meaning of disclaiming knowledge “not by saying “I don’t know” but by saying “I 
don’t say: I know it.”28 In other words, ‘I think P’ expresses a certain degree of 
caution. Similarly, the verb ‘believe’ (in contrast to ‘I think’ for instance) seems to 
play an indicative function. As Aijmer claims: “I believe does not only express a 
subjective attitude. It also conveys that the speaker has some evidence for what he 
says.”29 We can see the contrast between ‘I think’ and ‘I believe’ in the 
incompatibility of ‘I believe’ with phrases like ‘I’m not sure.’ While ‘I think that 
Riga is the capital of Latvia, but I’m not sure’ is idiomatic, ‘I believe that Riga is the 
capital of Latvia but I’m not sure’ is not. This difference between the level of 
reliability that ‘think’ and ‘believe’ convey must not divert our attention away 
from the fact they share their basic function: they are devices for canceling or 
altering the speaker’s commitments. The verbs ‘believe’ and ‘think’ seem to be 
mitigators of the force of the claim. Of course, parenthetical uses are not restricted 
to these types of indications involving mitigations. Verbs as ‘rejoice’ or ‘regret’ 
indicate emotional orientation, others as ‘wish’ or ‘desire’ indicate the preference 
toward the commitments of the statement. What these parenthetical uses of 
propositional attitude verbs share is its function for providing indications or 
prescriptions to the hearer about how to evaluate the commitments of the 
proposition associated with the mental verb. As a conclusion, mental verbs in self-
ascriptions seem to have the pragmatic function of signaling certain attitudes or 
indications toward the commitments expressed by the statement under the scope 
of the mental verb.  
Taking this inside on board, when the young rich communist is evaluating 
what to do in the light of his future belief ‘I will believe social justice does not 
matter,’ he is considering the commitments he will give rise in the future given the 
content of his future belief. Furthermore, he assesses the type of actions he must 
carry out in the present in order to avoid his future commitments with the 
assertion that social justice does not matter. In this sense, we can recruit the same 
kind of commitment-based explanation without bringing out any type of access-
like explanation. Although this kind of explanation seems to necessitate certain 
notion of metarepresentation that allows the young rich communist to perceive 
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himself as a minded creature, it does not commit us with understanding self- 
ascriptions as descriptions of inner processes or psychological states, rather than 
expressions that make explicit the commitments with the present and future 
actions associated with the content of the proposition under the scope of the 
mental verb. Thus, the commitment-based approach could also give a plausible 
explanation of the metacognitive capacities the future directed self-control 
requires.  
A second objection against the commitment-based approach may cast into 
question its plausibility as a theory of the social function of speech acts. One may 
argue, for instance, that a neo-Gricean model of communicationprovides a better 
understanding of communication, and subsequently, for the cognitive function of 
inner speech.30 In the neo-Gricean model, a hearer expects certain patterns of 
actions from a speaker because her speech acts express certain mental states that 
are causally connected with the given action. For instance, when a speaker asserts 
P, the hearer can infer through different pragmatic mechanisms that he is 
expressing a belief that P, and thus, the hearer can expect from the speaker a range 
of patterns of actions causally connected with such belief. The neo-Gricean 
approaches to communication exhibit certain problems whose consideration is 
beyond the purpose of this paper.31 However, for the purpose of this article, it is 
sufficient to notice that such position requires our speech act to voice certain 
underlying mental states, which again brings out the problem of confabulation. 
Considering that inner speech requires putting to work pragmatic mechanisms that 
infer the mental states of the agent implies that the agent must be in a particular 
mental state that is causally connected to the private episode. However, as the 
empirical evidence considered in section 3 emphasizes, it is problematic to assume 
that our reasons, and thus our inner speech episodes always reflect an underlying 
mental state.  
On the contrary, this is not problematic for the commitment-based 
approach. As Strijbos& de Bruin argue, our confabulatory reasons can have two 
                                                        
30 For two well-known neo-Gricean Models of communication see Kent Bach and Robert 
Harnish, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1979); and 
Dan Sperber and Deidre Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition, (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1986). 
31 For instance, these approaches are usually committed with the idea that communication 
requires the instantiation of mindreading mechanisms that, as Tadeusz Zawidzki has emphasized, 
make mental state attribution computationally intractable (see Tadeusz Zawidzki “The function 
of folk psychology: Mindreading or mindshaping?” Philosophical Explorations 11, 3 (2008): 193-
210). 
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purposes.32 Firstly, they can help to give coherence to our previous actions by 
providing us with a narrative. Secondly, they can have a prospective function, 
generating commitments that we are inclined to conform, and thus, that regulate 
our behavior and cognitive mechanisms. In this sense, the commitment-based 
approach can help us to elucidate the regulatory function of inner speech while 
avoiding the problem of confabulation. That is, our inner speech episodes do not 
necessarily reflect our underlying mental states, rather than it help us to give 
coherence and regulate our actions by giving rise to the commitments with certain 
patterns of actions.  
7. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to present several concerns regarding the format view of 
the metacognitive capacities of inner speech and to advocate an alternative. The 
problems associated with the format view rely on the role that the model assigns to 
metarepresentations and the notion of access. The solution I have offered respects 
our intuitions concerning inner speech episodes and accounts for the 
metacognitive capacities of regulating and evaluation our cognition and action. 
This position offers an alternative that does not require postulating 
metarepresentations or considering thinking about thinking in terms of access. 
Furthermore, the theory can avoid two possible objections. On the one hand, it can 
account for the cases where our metacognitive capacities require self-ascriptions. 
On the other hand, the theory can avoid certain challenges that other views of 
communication that have enjoyed a greater popularity cannot avoid.33,34 
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33 This article was written thanks to the funding provided by the project “Inner speech, 
Metacognition, and the Narrative View of Identity” (FFI2015-65953-P)and “Contemporary 
Expressivism and the Indispensability of Normative Vocabulary” (FFI2016-80088-P) funded by 
Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad; and the postdoctoral research contract “Puente,” 
funded by the University of Granada. 
34 Thanks to all members of the Department of Philosophy at University of Granada (AKA 
Granada Gang) for helpful comments on previous versions of these paper. I would like to also to 
acknowledge the influence and support of Fernando Martínez-Manrique and Agustin Vicente.  
